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Scrape Timestamp (UTC): 2024-04-27 14:59:10.745
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Okta warns of "unprecedented" credential stuffing attacks on customers. Okta warns of an "unprecedented" spike in credential stuffing attacks targeting its identity and access management solutions, with some customer accounts breached in the attacks. Threat actors use credential stuffing to compromise user accounts by trying out in an automated manner lists of usernames and passwords typically purchased from cybercriminals. In an advisory today, Okta says the attacks seem to originate from the same infrastructure used in the brute-force and password-spraying attacks previously reported by Cisco Talos [1, 2]. In all attacks that Okta observed the requests came through the TOR anonymization network and various residential proxies (e.g. NSOCKS, Luminati, and DataImpulse). Impact and recommendations Okta says the observed attacks were particularly successful against organizations running on the Okta Classic Engine with ThreatInsight configured in Audit-only mode rather than Log and Enforce mode. Likewise, organizations that do not deny access from anonymizing proxies also saw a higher attack success rate. The attacks were successful for a small percentage of customers Okta said. The company provides a set of actions that can block these attacks at the edge of the network: Okta also provides in its advisory a list of more generic recommendations that can help mitigate the risk of account takover. These include passwordless authentication, enforcing multi-factor authentication, using strong passwords, denying requests outside the company's locations, blocking IP addresses of ill repute, monitor and respond to anomalous sign-ins. BleepingComputer contacted Okta to learn what this percentage was and how customers were impacted.
Daily Brief Summary
Okta has issued a warning about a significant increase in credential stuffing attacks against its identity and access management services.
These attacks, utilizing automated methods to test stolen credentials, have led to breaches in some customer accounts.
Identified attack sources include the same infrastructure previously noted by Cisco Talos in similar cybersecurity threats.
Attackers predominantly used the TOR network and various residential proxies to mask their activities.
The most affected are organizations using Okta's Classic Engine in Audit-only mode and those allowing access via anonymizing proxies.
Okta suggests robust countermeasures such as enabling 'Log and Enforce' mode, multi-factor authentication, and blocking IP addresses known for malicious activities.
The company also advocates for passwordless authentication and stringent monitoring of anomalous sign-in attempts to further secure user accounts.