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Dozens of solar inverter flaws could be exploited to attack power grids. Dozens of vulnerabilities in products from three leading makers of solar inverters, Sungrow, Growatt, and SMA, could be exploited to control devices or execute code remotely on the vendor’s cloud platform. The potential impact of the security problems has been assessed as severe because they could be used in attacks that could at least influence grid stability, and affect user privacy. In a grimmer scenario, the vulnerabilities could be exploited to disrupt or damage power grids by creating an imbalance between power generation and demand. Hijacking PV inverters Security researchers at Vedere Labs, the cybersecurity research arm of network security company Forescout, found 46 vulnerabilities in solar inverters from Sungrow, Growatt, and SMA - three of the top six manufacturers in the world. The potential impact of some of the vulnerabilities is significant as they could lead to unauthorized access to resources in cloud platforms, remote code execution (RCE), device takeover, information disclosure, physical damage, and denial of service. Of the 46 issues discovered, only one, CVE-2025-0731, impacts SMA products. An attacker could use it to achieve remote code execution by uploading .ASPX files that would be executed by the web server at sunnyportal.com - the company's platform for monitoring photovoltaic (PV) systems. In a report today, Forescout describes how an attacker could use the newly disclosed vulnerabilities to hijack Growatt and Sungrow inverters. The researchers say that taking control of Growatt inverters is easier "because it can be achieved via the cloud backend only." However, they note that although control over the device is not complete, a threat actor has access to the inverter's configuration parameters and can modify them. An attacker could enumerate without authentication usernames from an exposed Growatt API and then take over accounts by exploiting two IDOR (insecure direct object references) vulnerabilities, or steal credentials via JavaScript injection by leveraging two stored XSS issues. With this type of access, a threat actor "can perform operations on the connected inverter devices, such as switching it on or off." The researchers say that taking control of Sungrow inverters is "slightly more complex" because it involves multiple vulnerable components of the vendor's architecture: The two attack scenarios above consider only one residential and one commercial inverter but an attacker could follow the same steps to obtain serial numbers of accounts for a fleet of managed devices. With control over an entire fleet of inverters, an attack on a power grid could be amplified to dangerous levels. "Each inverter can modulate its power generation within the range permitted by current PV panel production levels. The combined effect of the hijacked inverters produces a large effect on power generation in the grid" - Forescout Vedere Labs An adversary could obtain a significantly more damaging effect by controlling the hijacked devices as a botnet in a coordinated attack to reduce PV inverters' power generation during peak production hours, thus influencing the load on the grid. The researchers explain that this is achieved by "modulating the power generation of inverters inversely to the attempts of the primary control." "When the primary control decreases the load at its maximum capacity, the attack will reduce all its load immediately, forcing the primary control to raise the load in the system followed by an immediate increase of the load by the attack" - Forescout Vedere Labs Apart from disrupting a power grid, the disclosed vulnerabilities can also be exploited in scenarios that impact user privacy, hijacking smart devices in the house that may be controlled through the vendor's cloud platform, or even ransomware attacks by holding the devices hostage until a ransom is paid. The researchers say that Sungrow and SMA patched all reported vulnerabilities, the former asking for confirmation that their fix addressed the issues and showing a willingness to improve their security posture. Growatt also fixed the problems and released the patches in a way that should not involve any modification in the inverters, the researchers said. The report from Forescout's Vedere Labs dives deeper in the technical details of the vulnerabilities and is available here [PDF]. Top 10 MITRE ATT&CK© Techniques Behind 93% of Attacks Based on an analysis of 14M malicious actions, discover the top 10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques behind 93% of attacks and how to defend against them.

Daily Brief Summary

CYBERCRIME // Major Vulnerabilities in Solar Inverters Pose Grid Security Risks

Dozens of vulnerabilities were discovered in solar inverters from Sungrow, Growatt, and SMA, which could potentially allow attackers to manipulate or disrupt power grids.

The vulnerabilities allow for remote code execution, device takeover, information disclosure, and even physical damage to the grid infrastructure.

The most severe implications include unauthorized control over power generation levels, destabilizing the balance of power supply and demand.

Attackers could exploit these flaws to perform broad-scale operations, potentially using hijacked inverters as a coordinated botnet to maximize disruption during peak hours.

While Sungrow and SMA have patched the reported vulnerabilities, the potential for a similar type of exploit remains a significant threat to grid security.

This analysis underscores the importance of robust cybersecurity measures in the energy sector, particularly as grid technologies become more integrated and reliant on internet connectivity.